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SAY-ON-PAY: CAUTIONARY NOTES ON THE USE OF
THIRD PARTY COMPENSATION GUIDELINES IN
THE UNITED STATES
TIFFANY RODDENBERRY
ABSTRACT
Outrage over executive compensation practices has fueled calls to increase shareholder
participation in the executive compensation process. Beginning January 20, 2011, the DoddFrank Act mandates shareholders receive nonbinding, advisory votes on the compensation
of executives and any “golden parachutes” provided to executives.1 However, the say-on-pay
provisions of Dodd-Frank remain problematic, particularly in light of the United Kingdom’s
experience with similar provisions. Despite greater disclosure of executive compensation
plans, many shareholders continue to lack the incentives and ability to accurately evaluate the
information given to make an informed decision regarding whether executive pay is reasonable.
The U.K.’s experience additionally generates a new concern: a third party certifier stepping into the say-on-pay process. In the U.K., two large institutional investors have put forth
best practices guidelines for compensation, and shareholder approval hinges on whether the
proposed plan complies with these guidelines. There is some concern that similar groups in
the U.S. will take on the role of third party certifier with their own executive compensation
guidelines. The risk with such guidelines is that power would vest in a select few groups
that have incentives to collude with boards and/or have goals that do not maximize overall
shareholder value.
Two proposals may alleviate these concerns. The first would require disclosure of executive pay to comparable firm executives to give shareholders a sense of the “market value” of
executive pay. The second would encourage the creation of best compensation principles that
better encapsulate what reasonable executive compensation should be. With one of these
proposals in place, shareholders may make better use of the say-on-pay provisions such that
only truly excessive pay is targeted and corporations may still properly tailor executive compensation packages to their CEOs.
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1. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, § 951, 124 Stat. 1376, 1899-1900 (2010) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Executive compensation practices have raised citizen ire perhaps
more than anything else in corporate governance—2006 proposals by
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to increase executive
compensation disclosure generated more than 20,000 comments and
more interest than any other proposal in the SEC’s history.2 As a result of those growing concerns, shareholders have now gained a new
bargaining chip in the continuing fight over executive compensation:
say-on-pay votes. Under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank), shareholders now must receive a periodic advisory vote on executive compensation plans (sayon-pay).3 While the vote is nonbinding, its results still carry a significant message to the board and to the market. Even though the vote is
based on the extensive executive compensation disclosure provided to
shareholders,4 Dodd-Frank does little to identify what the disclosed
information means in the market at large.
This Note unfolds in five parts. Part I briefly discusses past efforts
to rein in excessive executive compensation and identifies what
Dodd-Frank now mandates with regard to executive compensation.
Part II then details the results of similar efforts in the United Kingdom. However, such schemes still manifest a number of problems as
identified in Part III. One issue that has arisen in the U.K. is that
two “certifying agents” have dominated the conversation on executive
compensation, and Part IV considers the likely entities in the U.S. to
take on such a role. Any form of guidelines overtaking the conversation of executive compensation in the United States is troubling because of special interest involvement and related conflicts of interest.
Part V then suggests two potential solutions to these problems in the
new say-on-pay regime: (1) mandating that executive compensation
disclosures include data on pay given to top executives at peer firms,
and (2) mandating that all actors in the process, including the SEC,
cooperate to create nonbinding compensation principles to guide
shareholders in exercising the say-on-pay vote.
A. Past Efforts to Curb Excessive Executive Compensation
The provisions of Dodd-Frank are only the latest in a long line of
efforts to curb excessive executive compensation. Many of the efforts
have centered on more closely tying executive compensation to the
performance or conduct of the company. For example, since 1992 ex2. Christopher Cox, Chairman, SEC, Address to the New York Financial Writers
Association (June 8, 2006), available at http://sec.gov/news/speech/2006/spch060806cc.htm.
3. § 951, 124 Stat. at 1899-1900.
4. 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(a)(2) (2010) (calling for tabular disclosure “of all plan and nonplan compensation awarded to, earned by, or paid to the named executive officers”).
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ecutive compensation of more than one million dollars per year is not
tax deductible unless it is performance-based.5 Top executives may
face clawbacks6 of bonus or incentive payouts if their firm engages in
certain accounting misconduct under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002.7 Some efforts have sought to distance the board of directors from
determining manager pay; for example, stock exchange listing rules
require the creation of a compensation committee comprised entirely
of independent directors to focus specifically on CEO compensation.8
Other efforts have focused on increasing shareholder awareness of
their company’s executive compensation practices. SEC Regulation SK Item 402 is the current executive compensation disclosure mechanism, wherein corporate boards report the amounts of compensation
their top executives make. This is also the information shareholders
will consider when exercising their say-on-pay vote under DoddFrank. In Item 402, the corporate board must report all compensation given to its top five executives.9 Item 402 includes the Compensation Disclosure and Analysis (CD&A), which “is intended to be a
narrative overview that puts into context the executive compensation
disclosure provided elsewhere in response to the requirements of
Item 402.”10 In the CD&A, the board must “[d]iscuss the compensation awarded to, earned by, or paid to the named executive officers,”
including “all material elements” of the compensation.11 Such material elements include the company’s compensation program objectives, why the company chooses to pay each element, how each
amount or formula is determined, and the structure of long-term and
short-term compensation and how they relate to the company’s performance.12 The CD&A was created with the intended goal of rousing

5. Charles M. Yablon, Bonus Questions—Executive Compensation in the Era of Pay
for Performance, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 271, 280-81 (1999).
6. A “clawback” has been defined broadly to mean a method “for recovering benefits
that have been conferred under a claim of right, but that are nonetheless recoverable because unfairness would otherwise result.” Miriam A. Cherry & Jarrod Wong, Clawbacks:
Prospective Contract Measures in an Era of Excessive Executive Compensation and Ponzi
Schemes, 94 MINN. L. REV. 368, 371-72 (2009); see also id. at Part I (discussing clawback
provisions in the context of excessive executive compensation).
7. Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 304, 116 Stat. 745, 778 (2002) (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 7243(a) (2006)). However, the benefits of their use have been somewhat limited. See
Jeffrey N. Gordon, “Say on Pay”: Cautionary Notes on the U.K. Experience and the Case for
Shareholder Opt-in, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 323, 334 & n.41 (2009).
8. Gordon, supra note 7, at 335; see, e.g., THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, LISTED
COMPANY MANUAL § 303A.05, http://nysemanual.nyse.com/LCMTools/PlatformViewer.asp?
selectednode=chp_1_4_3&manual=/lcm/sections/lcm-sections/ [hereinafter NYSE LISTED
COMPANY MANUAL].
9. See § 229.402(a)(3).
10. Shareholder Approval of Executive Compensation and Golden Parachute Compensation, 76 Fed. Reg. 6010, 6015 (Feb. 2, 2011).
11. § 229.402(b)(1).
12. Id. § (b)(1)-(2).
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shareholder reactions to the firm’s executive compensation policies,13
including “private shareholder interventions with management and
directors, precatory resolutions, and ‘withhold vote’ campaigns
against compensation committee directors.”14
However, more direct shareholder participation through votes on
pay has also grown. Under the New York Stock Exchange rules,
shareholder approval has been required for equity-based compensation plans since 2003.15 A number of companies, including AFLAC,
Verizon Communications, and Hewlett-Packard, have already agreed
to advisory shareholder votes on executive compensation.16 Further,
financial firms receiving federal bailout money are required to provide shareholders with say-on-pay votes and abide by certain limits
on executive salary.17
Whether shareholders deserve this greater role in the process is
the subject of much debate. The ever-increasing amount of executive
compensation is arguably already tied to shareholder pressure, as the
increase in stock option components of compensation plans resulted
from calls for executive pay to be more closely tied to shareholder returns.18 Some blame the heavy hitter shareholders—the institutional
investors. “Short-termism . . . is bred in the trading rooms of the
hedge funds and professional institutional investment managers who
control more than 75% of the shares of most major companies.”19 Sayon-pay provisions may very well increase shareholder power and further
encourage the same “[s]hort-termist pressure” that contributed to the
excessive executive compensation practices complained of today.20
However, if one assumes the problem of excessive executive compensation exists, there is also evidence to suggest increased shareholder power works: companies targeted with shareholder proposals
tend not to increase CEO pay the next year as much as comparable

13. See Gordon, supra note 7, at 337-38; see also, e.g., Cox, supra note 2.
14. Gordon, supra note 7, at 338.
15. NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, supra note 8 § 303A.08.
16. Jie Cai & Ralph A. Walkling, Shareholders’ Say on Pay: Does It Create Value? 46
J. FIN. & QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS 299, 304 (2011).
17. Jonathan Weisman & Joann S. Lublin, Obama Lays Out Limits on Executive
Pay—Firms that Get Bailout Funds Face $500,000 Salary Cap, Must Disclose Luxury Purchases; A Move to ‘Claw Back’ Bonuses, WALL ST. J., Feb. 5, 2009, at A.1.
18. Mark J. Loewenstein, The Conundrum of Executive Compensation, 35 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 1, 8 (2000).
19. Martin Lipton et al., A Crisis is a Terrible Thing to Waste: The Proposed “Shareholder Bill of Rights Act of 2009” Is a Serious Mistake 1 (May 12, 2009) (unpublished manuscript),
available
at
http://www.wlrk.com/webdocs/wlrknew/WLRKMemos/WLRK/
WLRK.16657.09.pdf.
20. Id.; see also id. at 3 (opining that proposals to enhance shareholder power are “a
serious mistake, especially when the government has done nothing to either encourage
(or require) that money managers—the real ‘stockholders’ today—think and act on a longterm basis”).
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firms untargeted by such proposals.21 At the very least it would appear such increased shareholder power provides some benefit. In a
2007 study, Professors Cai and Walkling found that the U.S. House
of Representatives’ passage of a say-on-pay bill resulted in a positive
market reaction for firms with the most highly paid executives.22
B. Dodd-Frank and SEC Regulations
The Dodd-Frank Act, a massive overhaul of financial regulations
in the U.S., was passed July 15, 2010.23 Under Dodd-Frank, executive
compensation will be submitted to a mandatory, nonbinding advisory
vote by shareholders at least once every three years.24 Additionally, a
“say-on-frequency” vote will be implemented at least once every six
years in which shareholders will decide whether the say-on-pay vote
will occur every one, two, or three years.25 Moreover, under the recently adopted SEC regulations authorized by Dodd-Frank, the
CD&A will be expanded to include how the company previously considered shareholder advisory votes and how those votes have impacted compensation practices.26
In addition to the say-on-pay vote for regular executive compensation, golden parachutes will be subject to shareholder vote. In proxy
materials asking shareholders to approve an acquisition, merger,
consolidation, or sale of all or most of the assets of the company, the
proxy must disclose any agreements with executive officers concerning any compensation that relates to the acquisition, merger, consolidation, or sale.27 Such agreements are then submitted to the shareholders for a nonbinding, advisory vote to approve or disapprove such
an arrangement.28
Dodd-Frank also provides further rules to increase the independence of compensation committees and compensation consultants.29
21. Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, The Effect of Shareholder Proposals on
Executive Compensation, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 1021, 1022 (1999). The composition of executive
compensation in the year after such a proposal “shifts toward more cash, and less long
term incentive compensation,” though the study found that this change was not statistically significant. Id.
22. Cai & Walkling, supra note 16, at 18.
23. Brady Dennis, Congress Passes Financial Reform Bill, WASH. POST, July 16, 2010,
at A01.
24. Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 951, 124 Stat. 1376, 1899 (2010) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78n-1).
25. Id.
26. Shareholder Approval of Executive Compensation and Golden Parachute Compensation, 76 Fed. Reg. 6010, 6043 (Feb. 2, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R.
§ 229.402(b)(1)(vii)).
27. § 951, 124 Stat. at 1899-1900.
28. Id. at 1900.
29. See Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 952, 124 Stat. 1376, 1900-01 (2010) (to be codified at 15
U.S.C. § 78j-3); see also infra Part IV.C on the problems identified with compensation consultants, including various conflicts of interest.
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Pursuant to Dodd-Frank, the compensation committees of public
companies must be composed solely of persons who are “independent”
and members of the board of directors.30 The SEC in defining “independence” must require the securities exchanges to consider the
source of the committee member’s compensation (including any consulting fees received from the committee’s firm) and whether the
member is an affiliate of the company or its subsidiaries.31 Furthermore, if the compensation committee uses consultants or other advisors, the independence of the consultants must also be evaluated.
The SEC must identify by rule the factors that will affect the independence of consultants, including the extent to which the consultant’s firm provides other services to the committee’s company and the
amount of fees received by the consultant’s firm for such services.32
Companies must then disclose in their annual proxy statements
whether the compensation committee retained a compensation consultant, the existence of concerns over consultant conflicts of interest
and, if any exist, how the company addressed those concerns.33
II. THE UNITED KINGDOM’S EXPERIENCE WITH SAY-ON-PAY
While not an exact approximation of what will happen in the U.S.,
it is useful to consider the U.K.’s experience with say-on-pay. In 2002
the U.K. adopted similar provisions regarding a firm’s executive
compensation practices.34 This legislation expanded disclosure beyond
the requirements of London’s stock exchange and required an advisory
shareholder vote on the Directors Remuneration Report, a company’s
disclosure report of executive compensation.35 A few high-profile negative votes have occurred; for example, GlaxoSmithKline’s shareholders rejected a large golden parachute (estimated by shareholders
at $35 million) for the firm’s CEO.36 In the main, however, U.K.
“shareholders invariably approve the Directors Remuneration Report,” with only eight reported negative votes since say-on-pay’s implementation.37 Furthermore, executive compensation in the U.K. has
30. § 952, 124 Stat. at 1900.
31. Id. at 1901. The SEC has authority, however, to establish exemptions for certain
kinds of committee member/company relationships in consideration of factors such as the
firm’s size. Id.
32. Id. The Act does affirm that the decision of whether to retain compensation consultants is within the sole discretion of the compensation committee. Id. at 1901-02.
33. Id. at 1902.
34. Gordon, supra note 7, at 338. Similar rules were adopted in Australia, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden. Fabrizio Ferri & David Maber, Say on Pay Vote and CEO
Compensation: Evidence from the UK 1-2 (June 2008) (unpublished manuscript),
http://69.175.2.130/~finman/Reno/Papers/FMASayOnPay.pdf.
35. Gordon, supra note 7, at 338 n.56.
36. Gautam Naik, Glaxo Holders Reject CEO’s Compensation Package, WALL ST. J.,
May 20, 2003, at D8.
37. Gordon, supra note 7, at 341.
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continued to increase, though some evidence indicates that boards’
sensitivity to executive pay increased for its arguable targets: firms
with excessive compensation or otherwise controversial pay practices.38
Shareholder approval flows in part from the influence of the U.K.’s
two largest shareholder groups: the Association of British Insurers
(ABI) and the National Association of Pension Funds (NAPF).39 ABI
and NAPF have exercised this influence through the creation of compensation guidelines,40 which build on the best practices in the U.K.
Corporate Governance Code.41 The basis of the shareholders’ vote often hinges on whether the proposal complies with these guidelines.42
The influence of these groups cannot be understated. “Because of
the dominance of those two actors, . . . . [t]he tendency for firms to
‘herd’ in their compensation practices is very strong: follow the guidelines, stay in the middle of the pack, and avoid change from a prior
year, when the firm received a favorable vote.”43 As a result, U.K.
firm compensation practices have aimed for compliance and “stasis
rather than innovation.”44 In evaluating the study of Professors Ferri
and Maber on the U.K.’s experience with say-on-pay, Professor
Gordon notes, while there is evidence that pay decreases as performance declines, “there is no evidence of the reverse. . . . If that is the
result of a shareholder advisory vote, it seems an odd way to build a
system that relies on entrepreneurial energy and the risk of failure.”45 Also concerning is the impact the say-on-pay regime may have
had on CEO pay at the largest firms. “Since pay generally increases
with the size of the firm, this suggests that [the U.K.’s say-on-pay]
may have produced a decrease in the rate of compensation growth
where pay was on average the highest” and “most visible,” regardless
of firm performance.46
However, Ferri and Maber, in their own study, suggest that sayon-pay in the U.K. has had positive effects, with higher sensitivity to
pay “most[ ] concentrated . . . in firms experiencing substantial voting
dissent” against executive pay and “in firms characterized by ‘exces-

38. Id.
39. Ferri & Maber, supra note 34, at 29.
40. Id.; see also, e.g., ASS’N OF BRITISH INSURERS, EXECUTIVE REMUNERATION—ABI
GUIDELINES ON POLICIES AND PRACTICES (2009), available at http://www.ivis.co.uk/
ExecutiveRemuneration.aspx.
41. See FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, THE UK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE 22-24
(June
2010),
http://www.frc.org.uk/documents/pagemanager/Corporate_Governance/
UK%20Corp%20Gov%20Code%20June%202010.pdf.
42. Gordon, supra note 7, at 344.
43. Id. at 347.
44. Id. at 348.
45. Id. at 345 (citing Ferri & Maber, supra note 34).
46. Id. at 346.

940

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:933

sive’ CEO pay” prior to say-on-pay’s adoption.47 Arguably, this means
say-on-pay’s effects were most pronounced for its intended targets:
firms that were providing excessive executive compensation.48 An updated study conducted by Ferri and Maber also confirms that say-onpay votes have been used to successfully reduce rewards for failure.49
However, as Ferri and Maber note, their findings rest on the assumption “that on average shareholders are able to identify sub-optimal
compensation practices and recommend superior alternatives,” an
assumption they agree is up for debate.50
However, transplanting the impact of say-on-pay in the U.K. into
the U.S. is imperfect due to the differences between the systems.51
These differences likely allow for a stronger, more concentrated power exercised by U.K. institutional investors. While power is not as
concentrated in the U.S., as discussed in Part IV, three groups are
likely to take on the roles of the ABI and NAPF in a say-on-pay regime in the U.S. However, due to the recurring problems in any sayon-pay scheme, shareholders may need some aid in appropriately exercising their say-on-pay vote.
III. CONTINUING PROBLEMS
While say-on-pay has had positive benefits in the U.K., the concerns that have always plagued the shareholder-board power structure remain. These problems must be addressed before say-on-pay
can have a beneficial impact on executive compensation practices in
the U.S.
A. The Agency Problem
In negotiating CEO compensation, the consensus view in the U.S.
has been that the board of directors should serve as the shareholders’
agent.52 Under the shareholder primacy theory, shareholders are the
47. Ferri & Maber, supra note 34, at 2-3. “Excessive” to Professors Ferri and Maber
means “excessive relative to [the pay’s] predicted value based on economic determinants,”
separate from “high raw CEO pay.” Id. at 3.
48. Id. at 3-4.
49. Fabrizio Ferri & David Maber, Say on Pay Votes and CEO Compensation: Evidence from the UK 4 (2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1420394.
50. Id. at 4-5.
51. There are a number of differences, but a few are notable for purposes of this Note.
Overall, the U.K. is more concerned with empowering shareholders, while the U.S. focuses
on making the board of directors more independent. Gordon, supra note 7, at 349-50. Ownership also differs. Unlike the U.S., where corporations are “owned” by the shareholders,
U.K. corporations are owned by institutional investors rather than retail investors. Id. at
349. Institutional investors in the U.S. are also greater in number and more diverse than
in the U.K. Id. at 351.
52. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law,
85 VA. L. REV. 247, 248 (1999).
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principals while managers and directors are the shareholders’ agents
tasked with running the corporate firm.53 In setting executive compensation, the board of directors must serve four goals often in conflict: (1) reward the executive for prior success; (2) provide incentives
for future success; (3) keep and attract managerial talent; and (4)
“align managerial and shareholder interests.”54 However, a structural
bias exists whereby directors often defer to the wishes of managers.55
For advocates of increased shareholder voice in setting executive
compensation, “the objective is not to substitute the shareholders’
business judgment for the board’s, but rather to buttress boards’ independence-in-fact by making them more accountable” to their principals.56 The concern remains that even the independent compensation committee may be captured by compensation consultants.57 Sayon-pay may alleviate these problems to some extent, giving shareholders a more direct way to express their dissatisfaction with the
actions of their agents in setting executive pay. However, as discussed in Part IV, some shareholders may have goals other than
maximizing overall shareholder value, and these shareholders may
wield the say-on-pay vote as a weapon to force the board to bend to
their will. Furthermore, increasing shareholder voice in compensation practice may actually jeopardize the board’s role as agent:
shareholders have designated the board as the ultimate decisionmaker, and say-on-pay votes—where there is relatively little cost
for a shareholder to make an uninformed decision—undermine the
board’s authority to make decisions regarding compensation.
While the vote is again nonbinding, it has important implications
for the board. As a result, the board will take the vote seriously,
while shareholders may not take it seriously enough due to the problems discussed next. At the heart of the agency problem is another:
the very informational asymmetry that necessitates creation of the
agency continues to exist under a say-on-pay regime and may further
frustrate the goals of say-on-pay.

53. Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power 2 (UCLA
Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Research, Paper Series No. 05-16, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=783044.
54. Gordon, supra note 7, at 329.
55. Claire Hill & Brett McDonnell, Executive Compensation and the Optimal Penumbra of Delaware Corporation Law, 4 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 333, 335 (2009) (noting that this
structural bias may exist for a number of reasons, including the idea that directors may be
beholden to corporate officers for their jobs).
56. Gordon, supra note 7, at 337.
57. Id. at 336. But see Brian Cadman et al., The Incentives of Compensation Consultants and CEO Pay, 49 J. ACCT. & ECON. 263 (2010) (investigating and finding little evidence to support the proposition that compensation consultants’ cross-selling of other services to firms has resulted in increased executive compensation packages).
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B. Informational Asymmetries
As with most decisions facing shareholders, an informational
asymmetry exists between the information held by the corporate
board and the information held by the shareholder. Increased disclosure regarding a firm’s executive compensation practices does not
mean shareholders have all the necessary information or the ability
to adequately process that information to make an informed decision
in a say-on-pay vote.58
First, the extensive disclosure as described in Part II.B does not
provide all the necessary information to make an informed decision.
Most importantly, it does not give shareholders a sense of the market
for corporate executives. “[T]he ‘market price’ for a CEO is hardly
self-defining, since the market for senior managerial services has no
posted prices—hence the hunt for comparators.”59 In individual cases,
executive compensation often becomes simply whatever results from
the bargaining process between the firm and the executive.60 In the
absence of “comparators,” it is understandable why shareholders may
not be able to adequately assess the reasonableness of corporate pay.
Also contributing to the difficulty is the complexity involved in
compensation plans.61 Many shareholders must attempt to understand the package before them without expert help.62 Moreover,
shareholders must understand whether the package is right for their
firm—this would require knowledge of alternative compensation
plans or again, expert help. The same hindrances for any shareholder
vote also exist—the benefits from gathering more information to
make an informed vote will be relatively small, even for large investors.63 Their efforts may be awarded with only a pro rata share of the
gains, and other shareholders may free ride off their research efforts.
Interestingly, shareholders are more supportive of proposals that
simply restrict executive compensation than proposals to increase

58. Many academics have questioned the net benefits of mandated disclosures. See,
e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of
Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 687-92, 709-15 (1984) (finding little evidence that increased
disclosure requirements by the SEC has resulted in any significant benefit to investors).
Even with increased disclosure, shareholders may still have limited incentives to ensure
they exercise their decision appropriately. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Privately Ordered
Participatory Management: An Organizational Failures Analysis, 23 DEL. J. CORP. L. 979,
1057-65 (1998) (identifying conflicting interests and disparity of access to information of
corporate constituents and finding shareholders may still lack the incentives necessary to
make sound decisions on either operational or policy questions).
59. Gordon, supra note 7, at 335.
60. Id.
61. Thomas & Martin, supra note 21, at 1033.
62. Id. Even the Disney corporate board required the assistance of an executive compensation consultant to understand the terms of the infamous Michael Ovitz compensation
package. In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 38 (Del. 2006).
63. See Thomas & Martin, supra note 21, at 1034.
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disclosure.64 This has serious implications for the say-on-pay vote:
perhaps shareholders will simply look at the compensation disclosed
and vote dependent upon whether it represents a decrease or increase as opposed to considering the information disclosed on why
the pay is reasonable or necessary.
This informational asymmetry may not exist as prominently for
institutional investors, who are typically sophisticated in corporate
governance affairs.65 However, even for these investors, certain information may be missing from their evaluation in a say-on-pay vote.
The most helpful information, to both individual and institutional
shareholders, may be a comparison of the applicable firm’s compensation package with other similar firms’ pay packages. As far as
Dodd-Frank and its accompanying SEC regulations go, this information is not included, but it may be a worthwhile disclosure to aid
all shareholders in making good use of their say-on-pay vote.66
1. Misuse of Signals
As it stands now, shareholders (even institutional ones) lack the
necessary information and require aid to make sense of the compensation disclosure before them in a say-on-pay vote. This asymmetry
must be overcome to ensure the say-on-pay vote is a credible signal to
the market.
Say-on-pay, while nonbinding, acts as a threat: if executive compensation is too high in the minds of shareholders, shareholders will
vote to disapprove the plan. The threat attached to an adverse voting
outcome will likely include reputational costs to the board associated
with negative public opinion.67 As former SEC Chairman Christopher

64. See, e.g., id. at 1022 (“[S]hareholders statistically are more likely to support executive compensation proposals that attempt to restrict executive compensation than they are
proposals that simply ask for more disclosure about executive compensation.”).
65. See K.A.D. Camara, Classifying Institutional Investors, 30 J. CORP. L. 219, 223-25
(2005) (finding that while institutional shareholders face the same informational obstacles
to voting as individual shareholders, institutional investors are better able to overcome
those obstacles). However, despite their ability to better participate in corporate governance, institutional investors may have motives other than general shareholder wealth. See
generally id.; see also infra Part IV.B.
66. See infra Part V.
67. See Ferri & Maber, supra note 34, at 9; see also Diane Del Guercio at al., Do
Boards Pay Attention when Institutional Investor Activists “Just Vote No”?, 90 J. FIN.
ECON. 84, 85 (2008) (finding that directors that ignore “just vote no” campaigns suffer reputational penalties in the direct labor market); Joseph A. Grundfest, Just Vote No: A Minimalist Strategy for Dealing With Barbarians Inside the Gates, 45 STAN. L. REV. 857, 86566 (1993) (while advisory votes are symbolic, symbols can have consequences through negative publicity and embarrassment). But see John E. Core et al., The Power of the Pen and
Executive Compensation, 88 J. FIN. ECON. 1, 1 (2008) (finding that press coverage focuses
on firms with higher excess compensation and greater executive stock option exercise but
also finding “little evidence that firms respond to negative press coverage by decreasing
excess CEO compensation or increasing CEO turnover”).
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Cox once noted, executive compensation reform depends in significant part upon business and financial journalists’ continuous scrutiny of corporate boards.68 Shareholders, through this nonbinding vote,
send a signal to the board, the media, and the market of either satisfaction or dissatisfaction with current compensation practices. Similarly to “just vote no” campaigns, this negative publicity then requires corporate boards to act to improve their reputation in the eyes
of the public.69 A negative say-on-pay vote may also send a signal to
the market for corporate control that this firm is susceptible to a hostile takeover.70 Further, a negative vote may also hurt directors’ reputations in the corporate labor market.71 If the say-on-pay vote is an
uninformed one (and one that votes against a good pay plan), then it
is being misused and represents a noncredible threat. Due to shareholders’ inability to appropriately use this threat, an incorrect signal
(the firm’s executives are unworthy of their compensation when in
fact they are) may be sent, and the market will dangerously react to
inaccurate information.
Some shareholders may use a say-on-pay vote as a threat unrelated to executive compensation and the motives underlying say-on-pay.
There is no true unified shareholder group; shareholders have divergent interests and some of those interests (those of hedge fund investors, for example) may not be in the long-term interest of the firm.72
Instead of using the say-on-pay vote to signal dissatisfaction with
executive compensation, certain large shareholders may wield the
threat of an embarrassing say-on-pay vote to gain significant bargaining power to pursue objectives that may not serve the interests of
the other shareholders.73

68. Cox, supra note 2 (The success of the new SEC regulations “largely depend[s] upon
business and financial journalists for its success. The degree to which [the media] publicize[s]
this new information . . . will have a significant influence on corporate governance in general.”).
69. See Grundfest, supra note 67, passim.
70. See Anabtawi, supra note 53, at 8.
71. See, e.g., Yonca Ertimur et al., Board of Directors’ Responsiveness to Shareholders:
Evidence from Shareholder Proposals, 16 J. CORP. FIN. 53, 54 (2010) (finding that a corporate board’s implementation of a nonbinding, majority-vote shareholder proposal is associated with a reduction in the probability of director turnover and a “reduction in the probability of losing directorships held in other firms”).
72. See, e.g., Anabtawi, supra note 53, at 4 (arguing against the conception of shareholders as “a monolith with a single, overriding objective—maximizing share value”).
73. Gordon, supra note 7, at 362. Professor Gordon also notes:
The question is, what are the checks and constraints? In the United Kingdom,
these checks have historically arisen from a pattern of repeat interactions
among a relatively small number of institutional investors of similar long-term
payoff horizons concentrated geographically in London. In other words, behavior can be observed, and reputations gained or lost.
Id. (footnote omitted). That may not be the same in the U.S. See id. at 362-63.
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Again, the nonbinding nature of a say-on-pay vote does not undercut its real impacts. In Ferri and Maber’s study of the U.K.’s say-onpay regime, most firms experiencing high voting dissent responded
by deleting controversial pay provisions—even firms with low voting
dissent proactively removed controversial provisions before the vote.74
This may seem positive, but the implicit incentives attached to advisory votes may have simply resulted in directors pandering to shareholders and implementing suboptimal pay practices.75
Hence, a condition for credible say-on-pay votes is that shareholders must “have the ability to discriminate between high-quality and
low-quality compensation plans.”76 Further, shareholders should only
use the say-on-pay vote as a signal with regard to executive compensation practices. Otherwise, shareholders are misusing the signal of
say-on-pay and jeopardizing the reputation of the corporate board
and the firm. As discussed in the next section, shareholders may turn
to a third party certifier to distinguish the good from the bad.
2. Adverse Selection, Certification, and Herding
An adverse selection problem arises because shareholders do not
have the ability to distinguish the high-quality compensation plans
from the low-quality compensation plans. This problem results both
from a lack of necessary information and a lack of the ability to process the information disclosed. Something similar to a warranty may
aid in that distinction; in the U.K. that warranty has been given by
compensation guidelines promulgated by two institutional investors.
These guidelines reduce costs for shareholders because they reduce
the costs of verifying and processing the disclosure information before them in a say-on-pay vote.
However, the result of using a third party certifier may cement
the “one size fits all” approach to executive compensation now found
in the U.K. With a lack of information as to what a reasonable pay
package is, firms may be overly cautious and seek the “middle-of-theroad” compensation plans approved by the guidelines.77 In the con-

74. Ferri & Maber, supra note 49, at 33.
75. See generally, e.g., Ravi Singh, Board Independence and the Design of Executive
Compensation (Harvard Bus. Sch. Negotiations, Organizations & Markets Unit, Working
Paper No. 673741, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=673741 (arguing that corporate boards which are most responsive to shareholder pressure often engage in costly
measures to appear more independent of management).
76. Ferri & Maber, supra note 34, at 9-10.
77. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decisionmaking in Corporate
Governance, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1, 28 (2002) (“Herding . . . can be a response to bounded rationality and information asymmetries. Under conditions of complexity and uncertainty,
actors who perceive themselves as having limited information and who can observe the
actions of presumptively better-informed persons may attempt to free ride by following the
latter’s decisions.”).
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text of merger guidelines in antitrust cases, “guidelines [have] become [unjustly] valued for more than the persuasive power of their
ideas.”78 In this context, the guidelines’ legitimacy increased even
though their legitimacy had not been established, and often decisionmakers explained or reconciled their rulings with the guidelines
after the fact.79 Generally, any “standardization” may limit innovation.80 This institutionalization effect has already been felt in the
U.K., resulting in a “herding effect” by which applicable companies
are using the compensation guidelines of ABI and NAPF to create
their compensation packages.81 To receive an approving say-on-pay
vote, companies effectively must comply with the guidelines.82 The
fact that so few plans have been disapproved in the U.K. does not
necessarily counsel against this concern; “[i]t is an even greater concern that the implementation of the guidelines may establish a
standardized form of compensation practice across an entire economy.”83
IV. LIKELY SOURCES FOR GUIDELINES IN THE UNITED STATES
In the U.S., several entities are heavily involved in the executive
compensation process, and some have already put forth executive
compensation guidelines. All of the groups discussed below have conflicts of interest when it comes to executive compensation; these conflicts should be addressed before any one group has significant sway
over the say-on-pay vote. Dodd-Frank only attempts to address conflicts of interest for one of these groups, compensation consultants.
A. Proxy Advisory Firms
In the U.S., corporate governance decisionmaking is often delegated to proxy advisory firms, a market whose growth has been
partially fueled by the increase in institutional investor holdings
because institutional investors are the primary consumer of these
services.84 The most prominent is Institutional Shareholder Services/RiskMetrics Group, Inc. (ISS).85 ISS advises on half the world’s

78. Hillary Greene, Guideline Institutionalization: The Role of Merger Guidelines in
Antitrust Discourse, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 771, 776 (2006).
79. Id. at 811.
80. Standardized guidelines may have resulted in “what we now regret.” See Gordon,
supra note 7, at 352 (explaining the “embrace of stock options in the 1990s resulted, in
part, from institutional investor pressure on firms to adopt this ‘best practice’ method of
enhancing managerial incentives”).
81. See Ferri & Maber, supra note 34, at 29.
82. Gordon, supra note 7, at 343-44.
83. Id. at 348.
84. Stephen J. Choi et al., Director Elections and the Role of Proxy Advisors, 82 S. CAL.
L. REV. 649, 655 (2009).
85. Id. at 649.
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common stock.86 This group currently has compensation guidelines in
place;87 ISS possesses advanced computer models which evaluate executive compensation packages and “makes these models available to
companies (for a fee) so that the companies can evaluate their pay
plans before submitting them for shareholder approval.”88
Potential conflicts of interest arise due to ISS’s infiltration into a
number of corporate governance service markets. ISS is the only
group that provides proxy analyses and voting recommendations to
institutional shareholders, “offers corporate governance advisory services to public companies, and issues corporate governance ratings on
public companies” that aim to aid investors in evaluating a company’s corporate governance practices.89 A substantial number of mutual funds and other large institutional investors outsource their voting
power and corporate governance decisions to this proxy advisory
firm.90 “Mutual funds rely on ISS’[s] advice in determining how to
vote portfolio shares and 15-20% of mutual funds have even authorized ISS to automatically vote their shares however it sees fit.”91 Additionally, ISS publishes corporate governance ratings on a number
of public companies; the rating, the Corporate Governance Quotient
(CGQ), indicates to investors the quality of a company’s corporate
governance structure.92 ISS’s clients have come to extensively rely on
these services, and many will not act without ISS’s input.93 As the
first on the scene in the proxy advisor market, ISS continues to enjoy
its “first mover advantage” and remains largely unregulated.94
All proxy advisory firms have been subject to much scrutiny as of
late because of perceived conflicts of interest, procedural opaqueness,

86. Tamara C. Belinfanti, The Proxy Advisory and Corporate Governance Industry:
The Case for Increased Oversight and Control, 14 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 384, 384 (2009).
87. See RISKMETRICS GROUP, U.S. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE POLICY 2010 UPDATES
(2009), http://www.issgovernance.com/files/RMG2010USPolicyUpdates.pdf.
88. Thomas & Martin, supra note 21, at 1035.
89. Belinfanti, supra note 86, at 390-91.
90. Id. at 385.
91. Id. at 386.
92. Id.
93. See, e.g., id. at 387 (The Chairman of 3M’s board told the SEC that “[m]any of the
top 30 institutional shareholders we contacted in each of the past two years to discuss our
position would not engage in any meaningful discussions, often citing adherence to
ISS proxy voting guidelines.” (quoting Letter from W. James McNerney, Jr., Chairman
of the Board and CEO, 3M Corp., to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n
(Dec. 5, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s71903/3m120503.htm) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also, e.g., HP, Compaq Merger Now in Hands of
Shareholder Adviser, REUTERS (Dec. 11, 2001), http://www.rediff.com/money/2001/
dec/11hp.htm (detailing efforts by both sides to obtain ISS’s support in the HP-Compaq
merger vote and observing that “[m]erging companies typically place a great deal of
weight” on meetings with ISS analysts).
94. Belinfanti, supra note 86, at 411-15.

948

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:933

and questionable validity with regard to some services.95 In June
2007, the U.S. Government Accountability Office conducted a study
to evaluate conflicts of interest that may exist with proxy advisory
firms and the steps that the SEC should take to oversee these firms.96
More recently, the SEC has increased its oversight of the use of proxy
voting services in compliance examinations of registered investment
advisers and mutual funds. In a Compliance Alert issued in July
2008, the SEC highlighted a number of deficient practices across corporate boards and proxy advisory firms alike.97 One complaint found
the board oversight of use of proxy service providers appeared weak;
“[i]n some instances, the funds had neither established controls to
confirm that the proxy service providers’ recommendations were consistent with the funds’ policies and procedures nor requested information regarding conflicts of interest at the proxy service providers.”98
Examining four proxy advisory firms, including ISS, one study found
that each firm tended to focus on a single corporate governance issue
and created recommendations depending upon that issue.99 When the
proxy advisory firm’s focus is known, institutional investors may choose
an advisory firm that is tailored to their shareholders’ needs.100 However, when those differences are not known, the proxy advisors may
lack accountability and could pursue their own agenda.101
There is every reason to be wary of overreliance on the guidance
offered by proxy advisory firms. These are groups that currently face
little accountability, and as Professor Gordon notes particularly for a
group like ISS:
In a mandatory “say on pay” world in the United States, it is easy
to imagine that a single entity could create guidelines, establish
rating systems for good compensation, consult with firms on how
to improve their compensation ratings in light of their particular

95. See, e.g., id. at 419 (“Although the development of its proxy voting policies is not
opaque, precisely how those policies are implemented remains unclear.”).
96. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-765, CORPORATE SHAREHOLDER
MEETINGS: ISSUES RELATING TO FIRMS THAT ADVISE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS ON PROXY
VOTING (2007), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07765.pdf.
97. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH., COMM’N, COMPLIANCE ALERT JULY 2008, available at
http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ocie/complialert0708.htm.
98. Id.
99. See Choi et al., supra note 84, at 675.
100. Id. at 696-97.
101. See id. at 697 (“To the extent that investors are not aware of these factors, however, the fact that the different advisors employ substantially different methodologies in
making recommendations suggests that investors may not accurately perceive the information content associated with a [proxy advisor’s recommendation]. This could lead investors to follow blindly the recommendation of a proxy advisor, even when that recommendation is based on factors that the investors would not consider relevant. . . . The result would
be to reduce the effectiveness of the shareholder franchise because shareholders would not
be voting their true preferences.”).
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circumstances, and then, behind purported ethical and physical
barriers, provide proxy voting advice to shareholders.102

B. Institutional Investors
Another concerning faction is the very group that ISS advises: institutional investors. Any increase in shareholder voice will give even
greater influence to institutional investors, “the predominant shareholders of record in modern corporate society.”103 The phrase “institutional investor” covers a number of different institutions including
“corporate pension plans; public pension plans; mutual funds; commercial banks; insurers; [and] investment banks.”104 No institution is
entirely indebted to corporate managers, but “no institution is conflict-free.”105 Corporate pension plans, for example, are often controlled by corporate managers, and while public pension plans may
not solicit corporate business, they remain responsive to political
pressure.106 These are sophisticated groups that can and do have the
resources and knowledge to better utilize the say-on-pay vote; however, their divergent interests may mean these groups are less likely
to have interests aligned with shareholder wealth.107
Institutional investors, especially public pension funds, have become active in corporate governance affairs.108 Due to a diminishing
ability to exit, institutional investors have turned to more active participation in corporate governance affairs to revive underperforming
companies in their investors’ portfolios.109 For instance, after frustration with CEO pay at some of its holdings, the American Federation
of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) began targeting companies in 2006 with shareholders’ proposals to impose say-onpay votes.110

102. Gordon, supra note 7, at 353.
103. Belinfanti, supra note 86, at 393.
104. Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor
Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 811, 815 (1992).
105. Id. at 827.
106. Id. at 826-27.
107. See generally Camara, supra note 65, at 226-42 (finding unpersuasive arguments
that institutional investors will choose only shareholder-wealth maximizing initiatives
instead of initiatives that benefit their sectional interests). But see, e.g., Stewart J. Schwab
& Randall S. Thomas, Realigning Corporate Governance: Shareholder Activism by Labor
Unions, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1018, 1023 (1998) (arguing that regardless of the specific interests of activist labor union shareholders, such shareholders require the support of nonactivist shareholders to enact corporate change).
108. Black, supra note 104, at 828.
109. James P. Hawley, Political Voice, Fiduciary Activism, and the Institutional Ownership of U.S. Corporations: The Role of Public and Noncorporate Pension Funds, 38 SOC.
PERSP. 415, 419-20 (1995), available at http://www.stmarys-ca.edu/fidcap/docs/
The_Role_of_Public_and_Noncorporate_Pension_Funds.pdf.
110. Barbara Kiviat, Giving Investors a Say on CEO Pay, TIME (Apr. 9, 2008),
http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,1729480,00.html.
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Two other public pension funds soon followed suit; the California
Public Employees Retirement System (CalPERS) and the Teachers
Insurance and Annuity Association-College Retirement Equities Fund
(TIAA-CREF) have also been a significant part of the activist shareholder wave in the area of executive compensation. TIAA-CREF has
distributed to boards its policy statement emphasizing the use of performance-based pay and listing ten principles that it believes boards
should apply to executive compensation.111 CalPERS has adopted
similar executive pay guidelines.112 However, these guidelines are
“fashion[ed] with only limited company-specific accommodation.”113
Extensive reliance on guidelines promulgated by any of these
groups is problematic due to the groups’ conflicts of interest. While
perhaps not as strong a concern for public pension funds, corporate
pension funds may feel less free to oppose executive compensation
due to their close ties to corporate managers.114 In addition, these
groups may reap other benefits from their close association with corporate boards, such as gaining employment consulting corporate
boards.115 Public pension funds, like CalPERS, may not engage in
such dealings with corporate boards, but these funds are subject to
political pressure.116 Moreover, as touched upon previously, these are
groups that may be less inclined toward maximizing shareholder
wealth and more inclined to promote their own objectives. Mutual
and hedge fund investors are geared toward short-term gains as opposed to the presumptive goal of shareholders for long-term gains.117
“Social” shareholders like public pension funds or labor union funds
may choose to push their own social or political agenda even at the
expense of overall shareholder wealth.118
High ownership levels, long-term ownership, and strong voting
authority have made institutional investors like CalPERS formidable
111. Thomas & Martin, supra note 21, at 1044; see TIAA-CREF, EXECUTIVE
COMPENSATION POLICY (2010), http://www.tiaacref.org/ucm/groups/content/@ap_ucm_p_tcp/
documents/document/tiaa01007957.pdf.
112. See CalPERS, GLOBAL PRINCIPLES OF ACCOUNTABLE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
(2010), http://www.calpers-governance.org/docs-sof/principles/2010-5-2-global-principles-ofaccountable-corp-gov.pdf.
113. Gordon, supra note 7, at 351.
114. See Grundfest, supra note 67, at 918-20; see also Thomas & Martin, supra note 21,
at 1035 (“Many shareholders, such as mutual funds, care about the liquidity of their investments and their short term performance. They are unwilling to invest substantial resources in bringing about corporate governance changes that have uncertain immediate
returns and may create substantial ill will from management.”).
115. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Less is More: Making Institutional Investor Activism a
Valuable Mechanism of Corporate Governance, 18 YALE J. REG. 174, 231-32 (2001) (noting
that a top official in CalPERS left the fund and joined a law firm that advises management
on takeover defenses).
116. Black, supra note 104, at 827; see also id. at 859 (“Public funds are highly vulnerable to political counterattack if they misuse their power.”).
117. See Anabtawi, supra note 53, at 22-23.
118. Id. at 32-34.
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voices in corporate governance.119 However, due to their divergent
interests and potential conflicts of interest, guidelines imposed by
these groups may be a questionable source of aid to shareholders in
exercising say-on-pay votes.
C. Compensation Consultants
Compensation consultants are often hired by corporate boards and
independent compensation committees to craft or evaluate executive
compensation plans. Compensation consultants are helpful in structuring executive compensation due to their knowledge and “access to
detailed, proprietary information about pay practices.”120 The CD&A
requires disclosure of the use of compensation consultants,121 and
Dodd-Frank will increase the requirements of disclosure.122
Compensation consultant firms may provide other services to
companies, such as advice on employee pension plans and benefit
plans as well as compensation advice on nonexecutive employees.
The involvement of a compensation consultant’s firm in various services for the same company prompts similar conflicts of interest as
found with groups like ISS.123 Further, while the compensation committee often has the exclusive authority to hire compensation consultants, the hiring decisions for noncompensation services lie with
the CEO. Thus, compensation consultants may attempt to curry the
CEO’s favor by recommending excessive pay packages to secure other
services for the consultant’s company.124 Some studies indicate that
these conflicts of interest do not factor heavily into excessive CEO
pay.125 However, a congressional study on the topic identified significant conflicts of interest, as companies that employed compensation

119. See Hawley, supra note 109, at 423. Other arguments have arisen that SEC Regulations
also unjustly gives greater power to these institutional investors at the expense of “mom
and pop investors.” See, e.g., Alinsky Wins at the SEC, WALL ST. J., Aug. 30, 2010, at A14.
120. Cadman et al., supra note 57, at 264.
121. Item 407(e)(3)(iii) of Regulation S-K requires firms to disclose:
Any role of compensation consultants in determining or recommending the
amount or form of executive and director compensation, . . . identifying such
consultants, stating whether such consultants were engaged directly by the
compensation committee (or persons performing the equivalent functions) or
any other person, describing the nature and scope of their assignment, and the
material elements of the instructions or directions given to the consultants
with respect to the performance of their duties under the engagement . . . .
17 C.F.R. § 229.407(e)(3)(iii) (2010).
122. See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
123. However, in one study of such consultants, little evidence was found to indicate
that these conflicts result in higher CEO pay. Cadman et al., supra note 57, at 264.
124. Gretchen Morgenson, House Panel Finds Conflicts in Executive Pay Consulting,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2007, at C1.
125. See, e.g., Cadman et al., supra note 57, at 280.
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consultants that supplied both compensation-related and noncompensation-related services had larger compensation packages.126
Dodd-Frank attempts to address these issues. Notably, shareholders will see in their annual proxy statement whether the compensation committee retained a compensation consultant, whether conflicts
of interest existed, and if they existed, how the committee addressed
those conflicts.127 The SEC is given rulemaking authority to strengthen the independence of compensation consultants, with emphasis on
whether the consultant provides other services or maintains other
business relationships with the company.128 These provisions will
likely make shareholders more aware of the conflicts created by compensation consultants.
While the above is a step in the right direction, the proposals in
Part V attempt to address the concerns created by compensation consultants, proxy advisory firms, and institutional investors alike: that
a potentially “conflicted” group will have too great an influence over
the say-on-pay vote. In fact, any one group’s sway may lead to the
“herding” and stagnation found in executive compensation practices
in the U.K. Thus, it should be considered whether a more objective
“third party certifier” may be employed to aid shareholders in deciding how to vote on say-on-pay while downplaying any potential herding effect. Part V offers two possible solutions.
V. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
A. Disclosure of Comparable Executive Pay at Other Firms
One way to enhance the ability of shareholders (particularly unsophisticated ones) to process and make appropriate use of say-onpay votes is by increasing the disclosure considered in the vote to include the pay of executives at similar companies. The current Regulation S-K Item 402 is limited to information regarding the applicable
firm’s top five executives.129 Comparable executive pay information
would give shareholders invaluable context: this information arguably
indicates to shareholders the market price of executive pay. More
than the breakdown of what is being offered in a pay package, this
demonstrates to some extent what the executive is worth in the market
of similar companies and gives a baseline of what is reasonable pay.

126. Morgenson, supra note 124, at C1 (“At 25 companies whose pay consultants came
from firms that also had highly lucrative contracts to provide actuarial or employee benefit
services, chief executives were paid a median salary of $12.5 million last year. That was 67
percent higher than the median salary paid by companies that did not use consultants that
were potentially biased.”).
127. Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 952, 124 Stat. 1376, 1902 (2010) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-3).
128. See id. at 1901.
129. 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(a)(3) (2010).
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The SEC would likely create levels, grouping similar companies
(and thus executives) together for purposes of determining what other firms’ executive pay should be disclosed in the say-on-pay vote.
This information is already disclosed in each company’s Regulation
S-K; the SEC would only need to compile and publish in accordance
with the level structure it creates. Companies would identify the applicable level and list briefly the compensation paid to comparable
executives in the say-on-pay disclosure.130 To handle situations in
which the proposed compensation package does not align within the
parameters of other comparable executive pay, the CD&A may be
expanded to include narration on why the executive pay may deviate
from the “norm” presented in the disclosure.
This proposal is subject to the same criticism already leveled at
efforts to increase disclosures to shareholders. More disclosure does
not necessarily mean that shareholders will appropriately process
the additional information. However, the inclusion of this specific information may be one small distinction that allows unsophisticated
shareholders to at least grasp the larger picture of executive compensation. Instead of being instantly outraged by the pay proposed,
shareholders may more coolly understand why the company is paying
their executive so much: to avoid losing that talent to similar companies. If the pay disclosed is out-of-sync with other executive plans,
and the firm’s explanation in their CD&A comes up short, shareholders may make a more reasoned decision to vote no on say-on-pay.
To be fair, this proposal does not fully address the concern of herding and may serve to exacerbate it. Shareholders may too greatly rely
on the pay of comparable executives, and a say-on-pay vote may
hinge on whether the proposed pay fits “the norm.” However, even if
say-on-pay does not wield the presumed influence this Note accords
it, the problem of herding in executive compensation practices would
likely arise. For example, companies may use the same compensation
consultants, and those consultants may continually recommend a
standard compensation package.
What may overcome the problem of herding exacerbated by this
proposal is to emphasize use of the CD&A as a way to answer for deviations from the norm. In conjunction, the SEC should emphasize
that pay deviations from the “norm” presented in the comparable executive pay disclosure are fine. The company would use the CD&A,
however, to explain why the compensation proposed differs from that
of comparable executives. Compensation consultants, when used,
130. This Note does not attempt to determine the level of disclosure required but simply argues that such information should be included. Although overly extensive disclosure
may further obscure the necessary information, this Note assumes that the information
disclosed would be concise yet extensive enough to convey to the shareholder the market
for comparable executives.
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would be encouraged to work with corporate boards to use the CD&A
in this way and to avoid simply proposing “one-size-fits-all” compensation packages. This will allow shareholders to meaningfully evaluate the proposed pay in a say-on-pay vote, and companies will be able
to tailor compensation packages without the overriding pressure to
conform to any norms in pay when unwarranted.
B. SEC Guiding Principles of Executive Compensation
The SEC may also consider reevaluating and reissuing guiding
(but nonbinding) principles of executive compensation. In 2009,
Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner issued a general outline on principles of executive compensation in conjunction with the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP),131 but these should be expanded in light
of Dodd-Frank and seek the input of compensation consultants, institutional investors, proxy advisory firms, and other relevant actors.
These principles should also leave room for innovation: it should be
emphasized in both the principles and the firm’s CD&A that each
firm is different and may require a unique compensation plan. These
principles will serve as a more objective third party certifier that
shareholders may turn to in deciding how to act in a say-on-pay vote.
It would also hopefully discourage shareholders from turning to less
objective guidelines, such as those promulgated by ISS and institutional investors. The guidelines may even include language acknowledging the presence of such guidelines, but warning shareholders
that such entities may have interests ill-suited to overall shareholder
value. However, the SEC should seek input from all of the actors
identified in Part IV in creating the compensation principles, as they
are a continuing and experienced part of the U.S. conversation on
executive pay.
Further, the SEC principles may also discourage annual say-onpay votes in favor of exercising a say-on-pay vote every three years.
Three years may give shareholders a better picture of firm health to
determine whether the proposed compensation plan is justified. Allowing a shareholder vote every year may obscure subtle increases in
pay and prompt less concern with shareholders than if the say-onpay vote were conducted every three years.
This proposal also prompts criticisms. Herding might be exacerbated if shareholders come to extensively rely on compliance with the
principles in determining how they exercise their say-on-pay vote.
However, the SEC must both emphasize the principles’ nonbinding
nature as well as the need for innovation in compensation packages.
131. See Press Release, U.S. Treasury, Statement by Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner
on Compensation (June 10, 2009), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/pressreleases/Pages/tg163.aspx.
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This proposal would also impose costs upon the SEC, as the SEC
would have to promulgate these principles. However, the costs would
likely be no more than those associated with other rulemaking requirements imposed by Dodd-Frank.
The principles should be loosely drawn—though perhaps as not as
loosely drawn as they are in the 2009 TARP guidelines—but provide
enough guidance so that shareholders may evaluate compensation
pay packages on their own terms. These principles should also address a number of industries’ compensation practices. To emphasize
the need for innovation and discourage any herding effect, the principles should also outline examples of “worthy” deviations from the
norm: scenarios in which pay represented in a say-on-pay vote does
not reflect the norm presented across the field of comparable executive pay but is still reasonable.
With such principles in place, shareholders will be less likely to
turn to the guidance of conflicted groups like those discussed in Part
IV. Instead, shareholders will turn to the SEC principles to aid them
in deciding how to vote in a say-on-pay vote. This will ensure that the
say-on-pay vote is a credible signal to the board and market. By ensuring credibility in the say-on-pay vote, the boards and market will
be more trusting of its results; thus, shareholder voice is truly
strengthened and the purpose of say-on-pay is realized.
VI. CONCLUSION
The U.K.’s experience with similar say-on-provisions reveals a
troubling aspect to say-on-pay’s implementation in the U.S.: the use
of best practices compensation guidelines may result in opportunistic
interjection by questionable U.S. groups, including proxy advisory
firms, institutional investors, and compensation consultants. However, due to the informational asymmetry between boards and shareholders and the resulting adverse selection problem, some sort of certification may aid shareholders in making the say-on-pay vote a credible signal to the board and market. That in effect “warranty” on the
proposed compensation plan may be given by either disclosure of
(and comparison to) to the pay of other, similarly-situated firms’ executives, or by the SEC’s crafting of guidelines to aid shareholders in
making the decision of whether to approve or disapprove compensation. Regardless of whether any of these solutions are considered,
shareholders now have a significant bargaining chip in the DoddFrank say-on-pay vote; one hopes shareholders will use it wisely.

